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Ontological fallacy

The (falsely) assumed existence of something on the grounds that there is a name for it, or because it is conceivable that there could be such a thing.

For example:

There is the word “unicorn”, which denotes a mythological creature that has certain characteristics.
Consequently, there are also “unicorns” with these characteristics.

Evidently, the fact that the word or concept “unicorn” exists does not mean that such creatures actually exist.

Description

The mere fact that a term exists is not sufficient reason to assume that the phenomenon described by the term also exists.

This sounds obvious when you talk e.g. about mythical creatures (such as the unicorn mentioned above), but can sometimes be very challenging to clarify when it comes to abstract terms with complex implications: an expression such as “juvenile delinquency”, for example, implies that it would describe a phenomenon that would have to be considered separately from general delinquency – whether this is really justified depends on the context. Simply assuming it is the case, because there is a word for it is however not justified.

Terms in political discourse

Especially in political and social discourse, terms are often used simply because they are catchy and memorable – or, quite simply, because they are already widely used. However, this does not necessarily mean that they are particularly helpful in understanding an issue. If in doubt, it is therefore advisable to first determine to what extent the term in question is truly appropriate in the specific context, or whether it might instead contribute to confusion.

Let’s take the following statement as an example:

“The trend in juvenile crime is cause for concern.”

The term “juvenile crime” here is a rather loosely defined concept that can refer to very different phenomena in different contexts.

What's important to note here is that using this term implies that it refers to a specific phenomenon that should be considered separately from general crime. Whether that is actually the case, however, depends on the specific context. In any event, it is not justified to simply assume this is the case just because the term exists.

Political or Religious Symbols

Various political, ideological, or religious symbols are often strongly associated with the entities they represent.

In many countries, failing to treat the national flag with sufficient respect is considered an insult to the country it represents—an offense that, in extreme cases, can result in severe penalties.

In the context of religion as well, symbols such as the Christian cross, the Star of David, or the Muslim crescent (hilal [هلال]) are not only viewed as symbols of their respective religions but are often equated with them, so that any actual or perceived disparagement of these symbols is also seen as an affront to the religion itself.

Distinction

At the heart of this fallacy lies the assumption that because a term or concept exists, one can conclude that the object, phenomenon, or concept it describes must also exist. However, it is not always easy to distinguish this from other phenomena within the category of fallacies of abstraction.

For example, the semiotic fallacy refers to the confusion of a symbol with the object (thing, phenomenon, or concept) it represents. At least in certain cases, the ontological fallacy can be understood as a special form of the semiotic one, namely when such a confusion is the cause of the misapprehension.

The same applies to the phenomenon referred to here as “hypostatization”. This fallacy involves treating something abstract as if it were concrete. Again, at least in certain cases, this may indeed be the underlying error behind the ontological fallacy.

Finally, the term “reification” can be understood in a very general sense as an umbrella term for the aforementioned fallacies. In this sense, the ontological fallacy could also be viewed as a kind of reification fallacy.

Examples

Proslogion

The so-called “ontological argument for the existance of God” (Pros­logion), originally formulated by Anselm of Canter­bury can be expressed in a (highly simplified) form as follows:

The term “God” refers to something that combines all conceivable positive qualities.
To exist is a conceivable positive quality.
Therefore, God exists.

Based on these premises, one can indeed conclude that it is possible to imagine the existence of such a being. However, the fact that one can imagine something does not imply that it actually exists (existential import).

Lexicography

A reference work, such as an encyclopedia or a dictionary, can be structured either ontologically – that is, as an overview of the meanings of words (which is typical of a dictionary) – or phenomenologically – that is, as an inventory of observable phenomena (an approach favored in many scientific reference works). There are good reasons for and against both methods, but the two approaches can only be combined to a very limited extent.

In the first case, it may be that words do exist and are in use, but it is difficult to link them to actual phenomena. In the second case, however, one may encounter phenomena that undoubtedly exist but for which there are no appropriate names (“lemmas”) under which they can be listed.

This has also proven to be a challenge for this project. There are numerous terms related to fallacies that, while they would fit into the topics covered by this website, do not clearly describe actual phenomena. The mere fact that a term exists is therefore not necessarily a good reason to include it here.

Conversely, the author repeatedly encounters systematic errors in reasoning for which there is (as yet?) no established term. Should these be included nonetheless, and if so, under which entry?2)

One might, for example, raise the (very legitimate) question of whether the ontological fallacy is in fact a distinct phenomenon, or whether it is not already sufficiently described by existing articles on semiotic fallacy, hypostatization, reification, and others.

In this case, the decision was made to create a separate article, since the other terms do not precisely correspond to this one, and there are also good examples that demonstrate the relevance of this specific perspective.

Another example is the term “reification,” which has been used by various authors in so many different (albeit related) ways that it no longer has a single, consistent meaning. In this case, it made more sense to “only” list it in the glossary as an overview page and to use more specific terms for the respective phenomena instead.

See also

More information

1)
For an overview, see Toni Vogel Carey: The Ontological Argument and the Sin of Hubris (Philosophy Now, 2005).
2)
It may flatter one’s ego to simply invent a new term in the hope that it will find its way into common usage – but even neologisms coined by far more influential authors usually end up as nothing more than a footnote in the history of language – Konrad Lorenz’ “fulguration” (as a term for what we now call “emergence”) being a case in point – and one should therefore avoid such endeavors as much as possible.

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