(Dogmatic) Coherentism

An epistemic fallacy in which statements or beliefs are evaluated primarily based on whether they fit into an existing system of ideas, a worldview, or a narrative – rather than on whether they correspond to reality.

In this process, coherence with the system becomes the decisive criterion, while verification against facts (correspondence with reality) is neglected or deliberately ignored.

This can be nicely explained using the following example:

In the 17th century, the Irish theologian James Ussher determined – based on genealogical data in the Old Testament as well as various theological considerations – that the world must have been created on October 23, 4004 B.C.
Although this date is coherent with the information found in the Bible (albeit with some caveats) and with the religious worldview of his time, it ignores the empirical findings already known in Ussher’s day, which pointed to a much older world. These findings did not “fit” into his worldview and were therefore ignored.

The most significant error underlying this misjudgment was that Ussher overemphasized the coherence with his religious belief system and, accordingly, underestimated – or possibly even completely ignored – anything that contradicted it. In short: “It fits into my worldview” became more important than “It corresponds to reality.”

However, this kind of mistake is by no means limited to religious or ideological topics. Even in everyday life, an overly dogmatic approach to coherence can lead to erroneous conclusions.

This article is currently in the process of being translated. It may still be incomplete.

In this article (and on this website in general), the term “coherence” (often in expressions like “coherence approach” or “coherence truth”, etc.) is used to describe a sensible and viable approach to knowledge acquisition, while “coherentism” serves as a negative term for situations in which the limits of the coherence approach are transgressed. The difference is explained in this article.

This distinction is sometimes treated differently in other publications. In particular, “coherentism” is also used in epistemology as an umbrella term for the various coherence-based definitions of truth – which we would thus refer to as “coherence theories” here. One should therefore always pay attention to the meaning in the respective context.

To clarify the distinction, the adjective “dogmatic” can be added, as in the title of this article.

Before anything else, it should be made clear that coherence is not an inherently wrong approach to building knowledge. Abstract scientific disciplines such as mathematics and logic are, in fact, based almost entirely on a coherence-based approach. Accordingly, coherence is also of great importance in other disciplines that draw on these fields. The best example is probably physics: As a natural science, it aims to observe reality, but in explaining it, it relies heavily on mathematical models, which in turn are based on coherence with a system of propositions – namely, that of mathematics. There can be no objections to this, at least to a certain level.

Coherence with existing knowledge is also one of the most important approaches – if not indeed the most important one – that we all use to learn new things. A fundamental principle of didactic methology is precisely to guide students toward specific content by building on what they already know, thereby steadily expanding their body of knowledge. Conversely, topics such as quantum mechanics or even certain aspects of stochastics are perceived by many as “counterintuitive” and difficult to understand precisely because they cannot be easily integrated into the framework of knowledge we are familiar with from high school physics and mathematics.

Moreover, coherence within a field of science is one of the central principles according to which knowledge is organized in modern science. Even though many of the details are sometimes hotly debated, this is, in principle, a sensible and, above all, fruitful approach.

Coherence in and of itself is not necessarily a bad thing. However, there is also a “too much” of it; a point beyond which it no longer contributes to increasing or structuring knowledge but, on the contrary, leads astray.

This point is reached when coherence is no longer understood as a tool that helps to better integrate new insights into an existing body of knowledge, but rather when it becomes an end in itself or a doctrine through which new insights that do not seem to fit into the existing worldview are downplayed or ignored altogether. Or, by extension, when it is misunderstood to the extent that findings arising from coherence with an existing system no longer require further verification of their correspondence with reality.

In other words: Coherence is not a bad thing in and of itself, as long as it is not viewed dogmatically – or, to put it less formally: as long as it does not become an “‑ism”.

It is not always easy to draw a distinction between coherence as a valid method of gaining knowledge on the one hand, and coherentism as a fallacy of thought and reasoning on the other. In fact, the question of where to draw this line is likely to be a subjective decision in many cases. However, this does not mean that the distinction is irrelevant or even impossible (Continuum fallacy).

In fact, several possible criteria for distinguishing between them can already be derived from the above:

Certain subject areas exist in which coherence with the established system of propositions is the appropriate approach. Mathematics, logic, and theology have already been mentioned. And there is no reason why this approach should not also be applied within these disciplines.

On the other hand, even though logic and mathematics are important tools for virtually all natural sciences, the correspondence with reality remains the decisive factor in scientific disciplines against which all insights must be evaluated.

As a first criterion for “coherentism”, one should therefore take care not to exceed the limits of the coherence approach’s applicability.

This is precisely the mistake James Ussher makes in the introductory example, when he uses consistency with a religious belief system to derive a conclusion about a physical reality – namely, the age of the world. However, this is no longer a religious question which could be answered within the framework of that belief system, but rather a scientific one, for which empirical data and observations of the physical reality should have been assessed.

In fields or disciplines where both approaches coexist (physics is, once again, a prime example), there may be good reasons to initially regard a hypothesis found to be coherent with other known statements of the field as provisionally true, as long as there is no evidence to the contrary.

Similarly, integrating new insights into one’s existing body of knowledge is a good way to learn new things or to better understand what one has just learned.

Both become problematic when one clings to such “coherent” knowledge, even if it has long since been disproved, even if there are well-founded doubts about it, or even if there is reason to believe that one may have fallen prey to one’s own confirmation bias.

At worst, one may become dogmatically attached to beliefs simply because they align with one’s worldview, regardless of whether they are consistent with reality.

To return to the introductory example: One could explain Ussher’s position by pointing out that geology was not yet a truly established science in his day. It is therefore entirely understandable that, in this situation, a theologian might have wanted to introduce a religious perspective into the scientific discourse. Modern proponents of so-called “Young Earth creationism”, on the other hand, who dogmatically cling to Ussher’s calculations while ignoring centuries of scientific findings in historical geology and paleontology, can however not claim this defense.

Another important aspect of coherentism is that, in order to fit a complex phenomenon into a theoretical framework, it is reduced to certain – specifically, the fitting – aspects, while other facets and explanations are set aside. This can be understood as a form of reductionism, as a complex phenomenon is reduced to fit a oversimplified explanation.¹⁾

Reductionism can be a useful approach under certain circumstances, but that is generally not true when it is based on ideology – that is, when one attempts to force circumstances into an ideological explanation, come what may. In such cases, it is easy to lose sight of whether an explanation actually reflects reality.

A good – albeit by now probably clichéd – example is how certain Marxism-influenced authors attempt to interpret every cultural and historical event from the perspective of a purported class struggle, even when this seems highly far-fetched.

„Der von Spartacus geführte Sklavenaufstand zeigt den Kampf des Proletariats gegen die Ausbeutung durch die Bourgeoisie.”

While exploring the similarities and differences between the situation of slaves in Roman times and that of workers in the early capitalist era would certainly be an interesting essay topic, such anachronistic interpretations do not help in understanding the motivations and self-perceptions of either of them. Ultimately, early capitalist society is hardly comparable to that of the Roman Empire.

On a completely different political spectrum – but no less clichéd for that – certain proponents of neoliberal ideology seek to reduce every social problem to the perspective of market mechanisms and utility maximization:

“Rising rents are not a social problem, but a market signal. Anyone who intervenes to regulate the market only makes the problem worse – the market would solve it on its own if left to do so.”

Such a statement may be expressed for strategic reasons (agenda-pushing), or it may stem from an uncritical approach to one’s own confirmation bias. Reducing such a complex problem to a single aspect is never helpful – not for understanding the problem and even less for solving it.

A wide range of such lines of reasoning can also be found in various schools of thought and disciplines influenced by postmodernism. In particular, the reduction of virtually any aspect of social discourse to its interpretation as an expression of societal power structures is a prime example of how circular reasoning can lead to a loss of touch with reality. Many of the “evidences” brought forward in such contexts only work as such if one interprets them within the very framework of the theory they are supposed to support. The question of whether this is truly the best way to understand reality is usually not even asked anymore.

This fallacy is listed here as an epistemological fallacy to emphasize the aspect of “false knowledge” – that is, the assumption that one possesses knowledge about something that is not, however, based on a reliable foundation.

If, instead, one considers the aspect of confusing model and reality to be more important, one could also classify it as a fallacy of abstraction instead.

At the level of the individual, dogmatic coherentism is closely linked to the cognitive bias known as the “confirmation bias”. This involves assessing information and arguments that contradict one’s existing opinion or attitude as less significant and less weighty than those that appear to confirm it.

These two phenomena reinforce each other: Confirmation bias makes a belief system appear more coherent than it actually is; coherentism ensures that contradictions are not even recognized as such in the first place.

The counterpart to this at the level of groups or communities would be phenomena such as “groupthink” – or, in extreme cases, “circlejerking”. Both describe situations in which certain opinions or attitudes have become so firmly established within a group that they are no longer questioned or tested against reality.

Last but not least, a worldview or belief system that is mostly supported by evidence that only holds up when interpreted within that very system can also be viewed as a form of circular reasoning.

The history of astrology and astronomy illustrates perfectly the extent to which a dogmatic approach to coherence with one’s own worldview can cause a discipline to lose touch with reality: From today’s perspective, it is easy to forget that these two disciplines were actually closely linked since antiquity and that their separation occurred relatively late in their history (around the 17th century). This separation was largely based on the question of whether celestial phenomena should be interpreted using traditional systems of interpretation (i.e., in coherence with the existing body of knowledge) or on the basis of empirical studies (correspondence with reality).

As a result, astronomy became a modern natural science, while astrology is now considered a pseudoscience. The reason for the latter is precisely the dogmatic approach that prevails in this discipline: Astrologers make predictions based on consistency with their long-established belief system. Whether these predictions actually come true more often than by chance is of no consequence to the discipline.

Much the same applies to homeopathy, a pseudoscientific method of healing and treatment that has demonstrably failed to produce any therapeutic effects that cannot also be explained by the placebo effect. Here, too, a form of dogmatism is upheld, according to which consistency with the internal theoretical framework is more important than alignment with reality – in other words: are there actually cases of successful healing that confirm the theory?

In the field of homeopathy, the euphemism “internal consensus” (German: “Binnenkonsens”) has been established to describe precisely this situation.

Now, it is easy to accuse pseudoscience and religious zealots of dishonest practices. Unfortunately, there are also plenty of examples of similar mindsets in established disciplines as well as in general public discourse:

Various forms of psychoanalysis (particularly early forms based on Freud or Adler) were interpreted by some (not all!) practitioners in such a way that they attempted to force every patient experience into the rigid framework of the underlying theoretical system, often without considering whether this actually described their experience adequately. This all too often resulted in downright tragicomic attempts at explanation, such as the following, somewhat clichéd exaggeration:

“The patient’s irrational fear of dogs must be understood as a consequence of his troubled relationship with his father.”

Even though psychoanalysis has long since moved away from such early aberrations, the tendency to interpret observations too narrowly from the perspective of a theoretical framework still persists today – it is possible that this theoretical framework has simply developed further. We should therefore continue to ask, in every case, to what extent an explanation that is consistent with the theory actually reflects reality.

Ideologically motivated aberrations and pseudosciences are of course perfect examples for this article, since the fundamental flaw in reasoning is most easily recognizable in these cases. However, this should not be taken to mean that an overly dogmatic approach to coherence is a problem only in these fields—and even less so that it is a clear distinguishing feature of pseudosciences.

In fact, we all commit such fallacies – and we do so on a daily basis. Here are just a few simple everyday examples:

An important example of this is when people believe news stories that may come from a dubious source but fit well with their own worldview (Confirmation bias). Or when they share such news stories on social media without verifying them because they align with the prevailing narrative within a group (Groupthink). All too often, this contributes to the spread of “fake news” or, at the very least, reinforces an incomplete and unbalanced worldview (Echo chamber effect).

Another area where a similar fallacy occurs, however, is the so-called “Sunk-cost fallacy” (also known as “Escalation of commitment”). This involves continuing to pour more and more money into a project or investment simply because that is consistent with the original investment decision, without critically assessing whether it still makes sense at all.

An important aspect of our thinking is the tendency to interpret our lives (and those of others) as a story or narrative – that is, as a sequence of causes and effects. However, what helps to structure a narrative can, when applied to real life, lead to important aspects being overlooked or ignored because they do not fit into the given narrative structure. The personal narrative thus becomes a system of coherence in its own right, determining which experiences are considered significant (Narrative fallacy).

These and similar examples show how quickly an uncritical approach to coherence can lead to consequential errors This raises the question of how this fallacy can be avoided.

The parallels to the Confirmation bias and Groupthink is also evident in the fact that the possible strategies for avoiding these cognitive biases are generally the same:

First, one should be aware of the framework within which a statement or piece of knowledge is being considered. Only then is it possible to recognize the limits of that framework – and thus also to recognize when those limits are being overstepped.

Likewise, we should acknowledge that our own worldview may not always be the only way to interpret events. To avoid becoming trapped in one's own narratives, it is helpful to actively seek out other opinions, perspectives, and ways of interpreting situations, and to continually ask ourselves how others might interpret the same situation.

This is especially important when it comes to group beliefs. It doesn’t matter whether we’re talking about an informal circle of friends or an academic institution. The views of other groups, outsiders, or dissenters aren’t always correct, but they usually help broaden our own worldview.

In many cases, it can even be helpful for someone to actively take on the role of “devil’s advocate” (advocatus diaboli ) – that is, to deliberately ask critical questions about supposedly indisputable truths – with the goal of scrutinizing one’s own position and refining one’s line of reasoning.

Another helpful trick is to approach the problem from the other side and ask yourself: “What facts or arguments could cause me/us to change opinion?” (Falsification).

And finally, as a general rule: The more important a question is, the more one should allow oneself to think it through rationally and without time pressure in order to arrive at the best possible result.

One of the goals of this website is also to provide the necessary tools for this.

• Circular reasoning
• Confirmation bias

• Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Coherentism in Epistemology on Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy