Rhetorical fallacy in which, instead of factual reasons in favour of, or against a position, reference is made to the consequences it would have if a position was true or false.
For example:
A: There is no evidence for the existence of God.
B: If people stopped believing in God, the world would sink into anarchy and chaos!That’s why it must be true that God exists!
Obviously, the question of what people would supposedly do if this question were answered in one way or another has nothing to do with the question of whether or not there is a God.
In many cases, the question of whether a particular statement is true or false has nothing to do with whether the answer to this question could lead to desirable or undesirable consequences.
Just as the example above distracts from the actual question by referring to the consequences instead of presenting evidence for the actual question (here: “does God exist?”).
Referring to the consequences of a position is of course relevant when the discussion is about the consequences of an action.
Like in the following example:
A: We should introduce a 30 km/h speed limit in the city, then there will be fewer fatal accidents on the roads.
B: Such a speed limit would only lead to more drivers breaking the traffic rules.
The purpose of the introduction of a speed limit would be precisely that it has consequences for traffic. The objection that this would also have negative consequences may be rather far-fetched in this example, but at least it is not an invalid form of argumentation.
Consequentialist arguments are not only used in defence of faith. The argument of antitheism, for example, leads in the opposite direction.
Note: The term “antitheism” is not used consistently and can have very different meanings depending on the context. In is used here to mean “the opposition to (organised) religion”. It is therefore a form of anti-religious belief. This position is usually justified by the view that the influence of (organised) religion on society as a whole is seen as negative.
This is to be clearly distinguished from the position of atheism, i.e. the position that there is no God or other deities.
These two concepts are also mutually independent: One can believe in God but reject organised religion, as well as an atheist can at the same time have a positive attitude towards organised religion. Nevertheless, it is likely that most antitheists also hold atheists beliefs.
The question of what value and effect faith and religion have on society is rather complex and also thematically beyond the scope of this website. However, as a question of social discourse, it is at least worthy of debate. And at least in this simple form, this does not imply any obvious fallacies.
This changes if one interprets the antitheistic point of view as an atheistic argument, i.e. as a statement like the following:
The overall impact of faith and religion on society and the individual is negative.
Therefore, one should not believe in [the existence of] God.
When stated in this context, the problem inherent in such a conclusion is of course easily recognisable: no knowledge of God’s existence can be gained from (real or supposed) consequences of the existence of religion. This applies in both a positive sense (as in the example in the introduction) as well as in a negative sense (as here).
The question of free will has, over the history of philosophy, been the subject of a long and often controversial debate (see also: History of free will). Once again, this topic is far too complex to be adequately dealt with on this website. For those who are interested, please refer to the linked Wikipedia article for further information.
Within the scope of this article, however, we can examine one interesting line of argument, and probably also way of thinking, that is often heard in different variations in connection with the question of free will:
No one can be held accountable for an act for which they had commit with no choice of decision.
If there is no free will, then all actions are predetermined, including crimes such as murder and manslaughter.
According to this argument, criminals should therefore no longer be punished because they did not commit these acts of their own accord.
Therefore, the position that there is no free will must be rejected.
Indeed, it would be morally indefensible to punish people for offences if we assume that they acted without free will. But this is not an answer to the question of whether or not free will exists.
You can take the argument even further and ask what consequences it would have for society if criminals no longer had to expect punishment. But again, this does not answer the real question, namely whether or not free will exists.